The impression prevailed that we could conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices.
The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted.
Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the Monarchy on a federal basis.

Our answer was that a one-sided concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was, naturally, not possible.

But still we thought that, under certain premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not meet with insurmountable difficulties.

As a matter of course, however, the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the frontier posts in the Monarchy.
It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's back.

I referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone accepting these views of the Entente.