In the summer of 1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less.
It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final military victory.
These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace wind blowing from the West.

Among other things, the Armand-Revertera negotiations were proceeding the whole time.

It is not yet the moment to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a sensation.

But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from the Ballplatz.

Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire group of Powers.
Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace; for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see Germany, her chief enemy, isolated.
There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the idea of a separate peace.