It is a well-known fact.
But it was a question of fears, not actualities.

A person who knew how matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral country in the summer of 1917, said: "If the half only of the fears entertained in England be realised, then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's hopes on the one hand, and subsequent events on the other, which had not been taken into account by German opinion.
However that may be, I consider there is no doubt that, in spite of the announced intervention of America, the summer of 1917 represented a more hopeful phase for us.

We were carried along by the tide, and it was essential to make the most of the situation.

Germany must be brought to see that peace must be made, in case the peace wave became stronger.
I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor that he should make the first sacrifice and prove to Berlin that it was not only by words that he sought for peace.

I asked him to authorise me to state in Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an agreement with France on the Alsace-Lorraine question, Austria would be ready to cede Galicia to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to Germany--not _incorporated_, but, say, some form of personal union.
The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all made the proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor William.