After the first _Ancona_ Note you veered round and declared in a second Note that "we agreed with the German standpoint in the main"-- that was an obvious yielding and contained a hidden promise.
I do not think that any legal wiles will dupe the Americans, and if we were to deny the promise it would not advance us any further.
But, secondly and principally, it is altogether impossible with words to make the Americans desist from war if they wish it; either they will make straight for war and then no Notes will avail, or they will seek a pretext to escape the war danger and will find it in our Note.
So much for the merits of the matter.
What you demand is technically impossible.

The Note was not easy to compile.

I had to alter it entirely as time went on; His Majesty then wished to see it, made some alterations and sanctioned it.

Meanwhile Penfield[7] importuned me and telegraphed even a week ago to America to reassure his people; the Germans, too, had to be won over for that particular passage.
You know how ready I am to discuss important matters with you, but _ultra posse nemo tenetur_--it was physically impossible to upset everything again and to expect His Majesty to alter his views.
In true friendship, your CZERNIN.
I thereupon, on March 14, received the following answer from Tisza: DEAR FRIEND,--I also note with genuine pleasure the success of your American _aide-memoire_ (meaning thereby America's resolve not to break off relations with us).

But it does not alter my opinion that it was a pity to admit that a pledge had been given.
It may be requited at a later stage of the controversy, and it would have been easy not to broach the subject for the moment.
Do you think me very obstinate?
I have not suppressed the final word in our retrospective controversy so that you should not think me better than I am.
Au revoir, in true friendship, your TISZA.
Tisza was strongly opposed to the U-boat warfare, and only tolerated it from reasons of _vis major_, because we could not prevent the German military leaders from adopting the measure, and because he, and I too, were convinced that "not joining in" would have been of no advantage to us.
Not until very much later--in fact, not until after the war--did I learn from a reliable source that Germany, with an incomprehensible misunderstanding of the situation, had restricted the building of more U-boats during the war.