If the effect expected by Germany was not realised, which was within the bounds of possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war in the enemy greatly intensified.

However that may be, the vanishing of the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact.
Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put forward by the Germans show a complete _novum_, namely, the danger on the Western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive that is expected.

Whereas formerly it was always said that the attacks of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered necessary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy into the line of action.

If these fears are justified, then most certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be accepted.

Both Count Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their grave doubts in this connection.
To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the Central Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to them in a proper light; and then later, after introducing unrestricted U-boat warfare, it would be seen that no other choice was left to the peaceful tendencies of the Quadruple Alliance as the means for a speedy ending of the struggle between the nations.
The leaders of the foreign policy agreed to take the necessary steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements had already been made.
Admiral Haus agreed _unreservedly_ with the arguments of the German Navy, as he declared that _no great anxiety need be felt_ as to the likelihood of America's joining in with military force, and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a ruthless torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been practised for some time past in the Adriatic.