But this opposition was not specially Tisza's, for whichever of the Hungarian politicians might have been at the head of the Cabinet he would have adopted the same standpoint.
I sent at that time a confidential messenger to Tisza enjoining him to explain the situation and begging him in my name to make the concession.

Tisza treated the messenger with great reserve, and wrote me a letter stating once for all that the voluntary cession of Hungarian territory was out of the question; "whoever attempts to seize even one square metre of Hungarian soil will be shot." There was nothing to be done.

And still I think that this was one of the most important phases of the war, which, had it been properly managed, might have influenced the final result.

The military advance on the flank of the Russian army would have been, in the opinion of our military chiefs, an advantage not to be despised, and through it the clever break through at Goerlitz would have had some results; but as it was, Goerlitz was a strategical trial of strength without any lasting effect.
The repellent attitude adopted by Hungary may be accounted for in two ways: the Hungarians, to begin with, were averse to giving up any of their own territory, and, secondly, they did not believe--even to the very last--that Roumania would remain permanently neutral or that sooner or later we would be forced to fight _against_ Roumania unless we in good time carried her with us.

In this connection Tisza always maintained his optimism, and to the very last moment held to the belief that Roumania would not dare take it upon herself to attack us.
This is the only reason that explains why the Roumanians surprised us so much by their invasion of Transylvania and by being able to carry off so much rich booty.