It was upheld when confronted by strong pressure from Russia, as also against other tendencies and a certain transitory ill-feeling in Vienna.
Whether such feeling did exist in Vienna or not I cannot say, but I believe the account is correct.
It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their effect.

I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of _si vis pacem para bellum_, and by emphasising the military power of Germany he endeavoured to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from declaring war on him.
It cannot be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak of war; but it is asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the _dolus_ of making war; that he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up war.
Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the injurious effects of his behaviour and to make him feel the growing mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two but dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on the Emperor.

It is quite true that of all the inhabitants of the earth, the German is the one the least capable of adapting himself to the mentality of other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were perhaps but few in the immediate entourage of the Emperor who recognised the growing anxiety of the world.

Perhaps many of those who so continuously extolled the Emperor were really honestly of opinion that his behaviour was quite correct.

It is, nevertheless, impossible not to believe that among the many clever German politicians of the last decade there were some who had a clear grasp of the situation, and the fact remains that, in order to spare the Emperor and themselves, they had not the courage to be harsh with him and tell him the truth to his face.