None of them wishes to compromise, they only look for victory: in that respect there is no difference between them." As long as I was in office the Entente would never come to an agreement with Germany _inter pares_, thereby directly forcing us to assume the part of a war of defence.

Had we succeeded in what we so often attempted to do, namely to make the Entente pronounce the saving word; and had we ever been able to make the Entente state that they were ready to conclude a _status quo_ peace with Germany, we would have been relieved of our moral obligations.

Against this may be quoted: "_Salus rei publicas supreme lex_"-- in order to save the Monarchy Germany would have to be given up, and therefore the other question must be inquired into as to whether the "physical possibility" of a separate peace really did exist.

I also mentioned this matter in the aforesaid speech, and expressly stated then, and withdraw nothing, that after the entry of England, then of Italy, Roumania, and finally of America into the war, I considered a victory peace on our side to be a Utopian idea.

But up to the last moment of my official activities, I cherished the hope of a _peace of understanding_ from month to month, from week to week, even from day to day, and believed that the possibility would arise of obtaining such a peace of understanding, however great the sacrifices.