I answered in the affirmative, so long as King Carol was alive; beyond that any guarantee was impossible.
3 Certain extremely important details relating to the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war can only be attributed to the influence of the group represented by Tschirsky.

It is incomprehensible why we granted to our then allies, Italy and Roumania, facilities for playing the part of seceders by presenting them with an ultimatum before action was completed, instead of winning them over and involving them also.
I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but King Carol in Roumania had certainly tried everything to induce Serbia to yield.

In all probability he would not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of renouncing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably an anxious feeling would have arisen between Bucharest and Belgrade, which would strongly have influenced further Roumanian policy in our favour.
Bucharest has made enormous capital out of the diplomatic proceedings.
Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron Fasciotti, the Italian Ambassador, harangued all the members in this spirit, and declared that the situation in Roumania and Italy was similar, and in each case there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome nor Bucharest had previously come to an understanding regarding the ultimatum.

His efforts were crowned with success.
On August 1, 1914, I sent the following telegram to Berchtold: "The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet Council.

After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that no party could undertake the responsibility of such action.
"The Cabinet Council has resolved that _as Roumania was neither notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade no casus foederis exists_.