I believe that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either--and this is the most favourable view--Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy.

It cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.
Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war would bring a Russian one in its train.

At any rate, the reports sent by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no doubt on the matter.
Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian war broke out.

Russia armed and joined in.

But at this moment extremely important events took place.
On July 30, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram received from Lichnowsky.