The question is certainly one of importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_.
=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas= "The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops.
Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion is a double one.
"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people, to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in the case of Poland.
"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state of complete anarchy and the utmost misery.

It should here be noted that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the life of a state at all is _German property_.

Railways, posts and telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands.
The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_.
"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which moreover _must be found_.
"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_.
"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they take time.
"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part of the Western Entente statesmen.

I have learned that some are unable to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_.

This was the necessary recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of treating for a general peace.
"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable peace or not.
=Wilson's Message= "I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole world.