If the Russian delegates demand any surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek.
"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations or indemnities--and nothing but new instructions from the various Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis--I then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all wished.
"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with _a single_ Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely fixed or explained among themselves.

We have to reckon with the following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St.
Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus.
"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to Brest-Litovsk.

We have then four Russian parties, and four separate Powers on our own side to meet them.

The case of the Caucasus, with which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to show the extent of the matter to be debated.
"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine.

In the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this delegation.