I must mention here that the idea prevailing in many circles that the Roumanians were quite at the end of their strength, and were compelled to accept all the conditions, is entirely false.

The Roumanians held very strong positions, the _moral_ in the army was excellent, and in the last great attack on Maracesci, Mackensen's troops had suffered very severely.

This success turned the Roumanians' heads, and there were many leading men in the ranks of the Roumanian army who sided entirely with those who wished to carry on the war _a l'outrance_.

They did not count so much on an actual victory, but were upheld by the hope that for some time to come they could maintain the defensive and that, meanwhile, the decisive successes of their Allies on the West would secure victory for them.

They were probably afraid, too, that a peace concluded with us would place them in permanent disgrace with the Entente--that they would lose the friendship of the Entente, fail to gain ours, and find themselves between two stools.
The second reason which decided me to insist on negotiating with the King was that, from a dynastic point of view, I considered it most unwise to dethrone a foreign king.