As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications, as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired.

The first person with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of acceptance.

On February 27, 1918, he handed me a _pro-memoria_ with the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions.

The _pro-memoria_ reads as follows: Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy could wish.
The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us are out of all proportion with Roumania's guilt and with her military situation.
Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift offered to vanquished Roumania and are _not at all to be made a subject for negotiations_.

In no case are these negotiations to assume the character of trading or bargaining.