By way of compensation, they asked not only for that stretch of land which they had ceded to Bulgaria on their entry into the war (Adrianople), but also a considerable area beyond.
In the numerous conferences at which the question was discussed, Kuehlmann and I played the part of honest mediators who were making every effort to reconcile the two so divergent standpoints.

We both saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks might be the result if a compromise was not effected.

Finally, after much trouble, we succeeded in drawing up a programme acceptable to both sides.

It took this form: That "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given back to Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be handed over as a possession to the combined Central Powers, and a definite decision agreed upon later.
Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with the decision, nor yet averse to it; but, in the circumstances, it was the only possible way of building a bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars.
Just as England and France secured the entry into the war of Italy through the Treaty of London, so did the Emperor Francis Joseph and Burian, as well as the Government in Berlin, give binding promises to the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these promises proved later to be the greatest obstacles to a peace of understanding.
Nevertheless, no sensible person can deny that it is natural that a state engaged in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will give rise to important or minor difficulties.

The fireman extinguishing flames in a burning house does not first ask whether the water he pumps on it has damaged anything.