Late in the evening I had a conversation with Kuehlmann and Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics.

I said again that I was ready to stand by them and hold to their demands as far as ever possible, but in the event of Germany's breaking off the negotiations with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a free hand.

Both appeared to understand my point of view, especially Kuehlmann, who, if he alone should decide, would certainly not allow the negotiations to prove fruitless.

As to details, we agreed to demand continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form of an ultimatum.
"_January 9, 1918._--Acting on the principle that attack is the best defence, we had determined not to let the Russian Foreign Minister speak at all, but to go at him at once with our ultimatum.
"Trotski had prepared a long speech, and the effect of our attack was such that he at once appealed for adjournment, urging that the altered state of affairs called for new resolutions.

The removal of the conference to Stockholm would have meant the end of matters for us, for it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of all countries from putting in an appearance there, and the very thing we had endeavoured with the utmost of our power to avoid from the start--to have the reins torn from our hands and these elements take the lead--would infallibly have taken place.