Dr.von Seidler took up the matter most warmly, and at the Council expressed the hope of being able to carry out these measures by parliamentary procedure and against the opposition of the Poles.
I will allude to this question also in my next chapter.
Closely connected with the Polish question was the so-called Central-European project.
For obvious and very comprehensible reasons Germany was keenly interested in a scheme for closer union.

I was always full of the idea of turning these important concessions to account at the right moment as compensation for prospective German sacrifices, and thus promoting a peace of understanding.
During the first period of my official activity, I still hoped to secure a revision of the Pact of London.

I hoped, as already mentioned, that the Entente would not keep to the resolution adopted for the mutilation of the Monarchy, and I did not, therefore, approach the Central-European question closer; had I raised it, it would greatly have complicated our position with regard to Paris and London.
When I was compelled later to admit that the Entente kept firmly to the decision that we were to be divided in any case, and that any change in their purpose would only be effected, if at all, by military force, I endeavoured to work out the Central-European plan in detail, and to reserve the concessions ready to be made to Germany until the right moment had arrived to make the offer.
In this connection it seemed to me that the Customs Union was unfeasible, at any rate at first; but on the other hand, a new and closer commercial treaty would be desirable, and a closer union of the armies would offer no danger; it was hoped greatly to reduce them after the war.

I was convinced that a peace of understanding would bring about disarmament, and that the importance of military settlements would be influenced thereby.

Also, that the conclusion of peace would bring with it different relations between all states, and that, therefore, the political and military decisions to be determined in the settlement with Germany were not of such importance as those relating to economic questions.
The drawing up of this programme was met, however, by the most violent opposition on the part of the Emperor.