Either you must organise those parts separately;--you must place in each section of the empire a portion of the government, and thus you will maintain security at the expense of unity, strength, and all the advantages which result from a great and homogeneous association:--or else you will be forced to centralise an unchangeable power, which, never renewed by the law, presenting incessantly obstacles to ambition, resists with advantage the shocks, rivalries, and rapid vibrations of an immense population, agitated by all the passions engendered by long established society.

These facts decide our position.
We can only be strong through a federative government, which no one here has the madness to propose, or by a monarchical government, such as you have established; that is to say, by confiding the reins of the executive power to a family having the right of hereditary succession.
You have intrusted to an inviolable king the exclusive function of naming the agents of his power, but you have made those agents responsible.

To be independent the king must be inviolable: do not let us set aside this axiom.

We have never failed to observe this as regards individuals, let us regard it as respects the monarch.

Our principles, the constitution, the law, declare that he has not forfeited (_qu'il n'est pas dechu_): thus, then, we have to choose between our attachment to the constitution and our resentment against an individual.