Yet, judging from the utterances of the leading men from the Rand who come down here, a very moderate reform would satisfy all except those who do not want to be satisfied, and, I believe, there is very little sympathy for the mischievous agitation that, rightly or wrongly, is attributed to the designs of Rhodes and Beit." On the 26th of May, 1899, on the eve of the Bloemfontein Conference, he writes to Mr.Fischer, prompter and organiser of the Conference, foreseeing the results of the policy advocated by Dr.Leyds: " ...

but there is, of course, an even worse prospect, namely, that misrepresentation may goad Great Britain into a position where, _with the concurrence and invitation of the other powers_, she might feel obliged, even at the risk of enormous military outlay, to cut the Gordian knot.

You will probably say, as I certainly say, 'where is the _casus belli_,' and refuse to believe it possible to imagine such a contingency.

Unfortunately, you and I, who keep our heads, must not ignore the fact that an immense number of people seem to have lost theirs and are ready, without reflection or examination, to accept the highly-coloured statements of a partisan press." He mentions the maladministration in the Transvaal several months before he had written to Mr.Smuts, asking for detailed account of the money granted by the Boer Government to Johannesburg but without getting an answer.
"Of course I know from previous correspondence that you and the President are not disposed to minimize the blots on the administration of the South African Republic, the weak points in the Constitution, and the ignorance and laxity that prevails in financial matters.

To do so would be to fatally complicate the situation.
"I am sure that you will, and I most strongly urge you to use your utmost influence to bear on President Krueger to concede some colourable measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as in those of his own State.
"Granted that he does nothing.