Thus, the weak, flattered man or woman manages to keep up a sort of fictitious belief in the truth of the words which are so pleasant to the ear.
It is plain that the external conditions of life impose on the individual certain habits of feeling which often conflict with his personal propensities.

As a member of society he has a powerful motive to attribute certain feelings to himself, and this motive acts as a bias in disturbing his vision of what is actually in his mind.

While this holds good of lighter matters, as that of enjoyment just referred to, it applies still more to graver matters.

Thus, for example, a man may easily persuade himself that he feels a proper sentiment of indignation against a perpetrator of some mean or cruel act, when as a matter of fact his feeling is much more one of compassion for the previously liked offender.

In this way we impose on ourselves, disguising our real sentiments by a thin veil of make-believe.
So far I have spoken of an illusion of introspection as analogous to the slight misapprehensions of sense-impression which were touched on in connection with illusions of sense (Chapter III.).