In this way it happens that we cannot sharply divide the feeling of the moment from its antecedents and its consequents.
If, now, we take these facts in connection with what has been said above respecting the nature of the process of introspection, the probability of error will be made sufficiently clear.

To transfix any particular feeling of the moment, to selectively attend to it, and to bring it under the proper representation, is an operation that requires time, a time which, though short, is longer than the fugitive character of so much of our internal mental life allows.

From all of which it would appear to follow that it must be very easy to overlook, confuse, and transform, both as to quality and as to quantity, the actual ingredients of our internal consciousness.
From these sources there spring a number of small errors of introspection which, to distinguish them from others to be spoken of presently, may be called passive.

These would include all errors in detecting what is in consciousness due to the intricacies of the phenomena, and not aided by any strong basis.

For example, a mental state may fail to disclose its component parts to introspective attention.