My self-observation, as well as the interrogation of others, has satisfied me, on the contrary, that this feeling distinctly colours the retrospective appreciation.

Thus, when waiting at a railway station for a belated train, I am distinctly aware that each quarter of an hour looks long, not only as it passes, but when it is over.

In fact, I am disposed to express my feeling as one of disappointment that only so short an interval has passed since I last looked at my watch.
Nevertheless, I am ready to allow that, though a feeling of tedium, or the contrary feeling of irritation at the rapidity of time, will linger for an appreciable interval and colour the retrospective estimate of time, this backward view is chiefly determined by other considerations.
As Wundt remarks, we have no sense of time's slowness during sleep, yet on waking we imagine that we have been dreaming for an immensely long period.

This retrospective appreciation is determined by the number and the degree or intensity of the experiences, and, what comes very much to the same thing, by the amount of unlikeness, freshness, and discontinuity characterizing these experiences.
Time, as I have already hinted, is known under the form of a succession of different conscious experiences.

Unbroken uniformity would give us no sense of time, because it would give us no conscious experience at all.
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a perfectly uniform mental state extending through an appreciable duration.