An intuitive insight differs from a sense-perception in that it involves an immediate assurance of the existence of a feeling presentatively known, though not to our own minds.

The object in insight is thus a presentative feeling as in introspection, though not our own, but another's.

And so it differs from the object in sense-perception in so far as this last involves sense-experiences, as muscular and tactual feelings, which are not _at the moment_ presentatively known to any mind.
_Illusions of Insight._ And now we are in a position, perhaps, to define an illusion of insight, and to inquire whether there is anything answering to our definition.

An illusory insight is a quasi-intuition of another's feelings which does not answer to the internal reality as presentatively known to the subject himself.

In spite of the errors of introspection dealt with in the last chapter, nobody will doubt that, when it is a question between a man's knowing what is at the moment in his own mind and somebody else's knowing, logic, as well as politeness, requires us to give precedence to the former.
An illusion of insight, like the other varieties of illusion already dealt with, may arise either by way of wrong suggestion or by way of a warping preconception.