Further, it will exclude a large part of the interpretation of actions as motived, since this, though sometimes approaching the intuitive form, is for the most part a process of conjectural or doubtful inference, and wanting in the immediate assurance which belongs to an intuitive reading of a present emotion or thought.
From this short account of the process of insight, its relation to perception and introspection becomes pretty plain.

On the one hand, it closely resembles sense-perception, since it proceeds by the interpretation of a sense-impression by means of a representative image.
On the other hand, it differs from sense-perception, and is more closely allied to introspection in the fact that, while the process of interpretation in the former case is a reconstruction of _external_ experiences, in the latter case it is a reconstruction of _internal_ experiences.

To intuit another's feeling is clearly to represent to ourselves a certain kind of internal experience previously known, in its elements at least, by introspection, while these represented experiences are distinctly referred to another personality.
And now we see what constitutes the object of insight.

This is, in part, a common experience, as in the case of sense-perception and aesthetic intuition, since to perceive another's feeling is implicitly to cognize the external conditions of a common insight.

But this is clearly not the whole, nor even the main part of objective reality in this act of cognition.