Owing to Britain's wise and continuing policy, and the excellence of the British sailor and his ships, the British navy proudly and almost tranquilly held virtual command of all the seas.
But shortly after this century began, British officers discerned a new and disturbing element gradually developing on the horizon.

The first thing which roused their attention to it was the unexpected attack of the Japanese torpedo-boats on the Russian squadron in Port Arthur.

No war had been declared, and the Russian squadron was riding peacefully at anchor.

The suddenness of the attack, and the distinct though incomplete success which it achieved, startled the British into a realization of the fact that there had been introduced into warfare on the sea methods and tactics requiring _a higher order of preparation_ than had ever before been known; that the scientific methods which the Germans employed so effectively on land in 1870 had been adapted by the Japanese to naval warfare, and would necessitate the introduction into naval policies of _speedier methods_ than had hitherto been needed.
Another event which had happened shortly before showed that naval policies would have to be modified, if they were to utilize recent advances in scientific methods.

This event was the unprecedented success at target practice of H.M.