Thus the practice of seduction may be said to be condemned sufficiently by the misery brought by it to its victims, and its victims' families.

But suppose the victims are willing, and the families complacent, this ground of condemnation goes; though in the eye of the moralist, matters in this last will be far worse than in the former.

It is therefore quite a mistake to say that the kind of happiness which it is the end of life to realise is defined or narrowed down appreciably by the fact that it is a general end.

Vice can be enjoyed in common, just as well as virtue; nor if wisely regulated will it exhaust the tastes that it appeals to.

Regulated with equal skill, and with equal far-sightedness, it will take its place side by side with virtue; nor will sociology or social morality give us any reason for preferring the one to the other.
We may observe accordingly, that if happiness of some certain kind be the moral test, what Professor Huxley calls '_social morality_'-- the rule that is, for producing the negative conditions of happiness, it is not in itself morality at all.