CHAPTER X.
MORALITY AND NATURAL THEISM.
Supposing science not to be inconsistent with theism, may not theism be inconsistent with morality?
247 It seems to be so; but it is no more so than is morality with itself.

Two difficulties common to both:--1st.

The existence of evil; 2nd.

Man's free will and God's free will 248 James Mill's statement of the case represents the popular anti-religious arguments 249 But his way of putting the case is full of distortion and exaggeration 250 Though certain of the difficulties he pointed out were real 251 And those we cannot explain away; but if we are to believe in our moral being at all, we must one and all accept 252 We can escape from them by none of the rationalistic substitutes for religion 252 A similar difficulty is the freedom of the will 257 This belief is an intellectual impossibility 258 But at the same time a moral necessity 260 It is typical of all the difficulties attendant on an assent to our own moral nature 260 The vaguer difficulties that appeal to the _moral imagination_ we must meet in the same way 261.