Possibly, therefore, Mr.Balfour's mirth was not merely sympathetic or humorous; it perhaps echoed his discovery that our position for three years had really been nothing but a sham; that the State Department had been forcing points in which it did not really believe, or in which it did not believe when American interests were involved.

At any rate, this ending of our long argument with Great Britain was a splendid justification for Page; his contention had always been that the preservation of civilization was more important than the technicalities of the international lawyers.

And now the Wilson Administration, by throwing into the waste basket all the finespun theories with which it had been embarrassing the Allied cause since August 4, 1914, accepted--and accepted joyously--his point of view.
II One of the first things which Mr.Balfour did, on his arrival in Washington, was personally to explain to President Wilson about the so-called "secret treaties." The "secret treaty" that especially preyed upon Mr.Wilson's mind, and which led to a famous episode at the Versailles Conference, was that which had been made with Italy in 1915, as consideration for Italy's participation in the war.

Mr.Balfour, in telling the President of these territorial arrangements with Italy, naturally did not criticise his ally, but it was evident that he regarded the matter as something about which the United States should be informed.
"This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a war," he explained, and then he gave Mr.Wilson the details.
Probably the most important information which Mr.Balfour and the French and Italian Commissions brought to Washington was the desperate situation of the Allied cause.

On that point not one of the visiting statesmen or military and naval advisers made the slightest attempt at concealment.