This will mean a fight in France and Belgium till a decisive victory is won and the present exultant German will is broken.
The minority section of public opinion--as I judge a small minority--has the feeling that such an out-and-out military victory cannot be won or is not worth the price; and that the enemies of Germany, allowing her to keep her Eastern accretions, must make the best terms they can in the East; that there's no use in running the risk of Italy's defeat and defection before some sort of bargain could be made about Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and Serbia.

Of course this plan would leave the German warlordship intact and would bring no sort of assurance of a prolonged peace.

It would, too, leave European Russia at least to German mercy, and would leave the Baltic and the Black Seas practically wholly under German influence.

As for the people of Russia, there seems small chance for them in this second contingency.

The only way to save them is to win a decisive victory.
As matters stand to-day Lord Lansdowne and his friends (how numerous they are nobody knows) are the loudest spokesmen for such a peace as can be made.