enfin par ce moyen nous nous remismes sur une ligne parallele a celle des Anglais.' Finally, in summing up the tactical lesson of the stupendous battle, he concludes: 'A la verite l'ordre admirable de leur [the English] armee doit toujours etre imite, et pour moi je sais bien que si j'etais dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse des vaisseaux du Roi je songerois a battre les Anglois _par leur propre maniere et non par celle des Hollandoises, et de nous autres, qui est de vouloir aborder_.' In defence of his view he cites a military analogy, instancing a line of cavalry, which being controlled 'avec regle' devotes itself solely to making the opposing force give way, and keeps as close an eye on itself as on the enemy.

Supposing such a line engaged against another body of horse in which the squadrons break their ranks and advance unevenly to the charge, such a condition, he says, would not promise success to the latter, and the parallel he contends is exact.[10] From this account by an accomplished student of tactics we may deduce three indisputable conclusions, 1.

That the formation in line ahead was aimed at the development of gun power as opposed to boarding.2.That it was purely English, and that, however far Dutch tacticians had sought to imitate it, they had not yet succeeded in forcing it on their seamen.3.That the English certainly fought in line, and had reached a perfection in handling the formation which could only have been the result of constant practice in fleet tactics.
It remains to consider the precisely opposite impression we get from English authority.

To begin with, we find on close examination that the whole of it, or nearly so, is to be traced to Pepys or Penn.

The _locus classicus_ is as follows from Pepys's _Diary_ of July 4th.