Again, in describing the danger Tromp was in by having weathered the English fleet with his own squadron, while the rest of the Dutch were to leeward, he says: 'J'ai deja dit que rien n'egale le bel ordre et la discipline des Anglais, que jamais ligne n'a ete tiree plus droite que celle que leurs vaisseaux forment, qu'on peut etre certain que lorsqu'on en approche il les faux [_sic_] tous essuier.' The very precision of the English formation however, as he points out, was what saved Tromp from destruction, because having weathered their van-ship, he had the wind of them all and could not be enveloped.

On the other hand, he says, whenever an English ship penetrated the Dutch formation it fared badly because the Dutch kept themselves 'redoublez'-- that is, not in a single line.

As a general principle, then, he declares that it is safer to 'entrer dans une flotte d'Angleterre que de passer aupres' (_i.e._ stand along it), 'et bien mieux de passer aupres d'une flotte Hollandaise que se meler au travers, si elle combat toujours comme elle fit pour lors.' But on the whole he condemns the loose formation of the Dutch, and says it is really due not to a tactical idea, but to individual captains shirking their duty.

It is clear, then, that whatever was De Ruyter's intention, the Dutch did not fight in a true line.

Later on in the same action he says: 'Ruyter de son cote appliqua toute son industrie pour donner une meilleure forme a sa ligne ...