The only experience the framers of the order of 1653 can have had of a line ahead formation must have been in our own service.
The clearest proof of this lies in the annexed orders which Tromp issued on June 20, 1652, immediately before the declaration of war, and after he had had his brush with Blake, in which, if Gibson is to be trusted, Tromp had seen Blake's line.

From these orders it is clear that the Dutch conception of a naval action was still practically identical with that of Lindsey's instructions of 1635, that is, mutual support of squadrons or groups, with no trace of a regular battle formation.

In the detailed 'organisation' of the fleet each of the three squadrons has its own three flag officers--that is to say, it was organised, like that of Lord Wimbledon in 1625, in three squadrons and nine sub-squadrons, and was therefore clearly designed for group tactics.

It is on this point alone, if at all, that it can be said to show any advance on the tactics which had obtained throughout the century, or on those which Tromp himself had adopted against Oquendo in 1639.
Yet further proof is to be found in the orders issued by Witte Corneliszoon de With to his captains in October 1652, as commander-in-chief of the Dutch fleet.

In these he very strictly enjoins, as a matter of real importance, 'that they shall all keep close up by the others and as near together as possible, to the end that thereby they may act with united force ...