The weather division, from being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend the success they may appear to have gained, &c.
'If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in pursuit.
'The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired throughout the British fleet from their being commanded by their beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet.
'It was successful also from the consternation spread through the combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss of the admiral's ship early in the action.
'The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and light airs.
'At the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking ship could fire a gun in her defence.
'It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of them, they are placed, for the most part, _hors de combat_ for the rest of the action.
'Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear could possibly come to their assistance.
'In proceeding to the attack of October 21, the weather was exactly such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the British were six or seven miles distant.

By the mode of attacking in detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the British were, on that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was totally lost.
'The Victory, Temeraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus and Bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their guns could have extricated them.

If the enemy's vessels had closed up as they ought to have done, _from van to rear_, and had possessed a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even British skill and British gallantry could not have availed.

The position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which the British were desirous of being placed; namely, to have part of an opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body.
'The French admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive gallantry; and certainly the French Intrepide, with some others, evinced active courage equal to the British; but there was no nautical management, no skilful manoeuvring.
'It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of the Trafalgar attack; but it is only just, to point out the advantages and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment of great results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances may be well weighed before such means are applied.

A plan, to be entirely correct, must be suited to all cases.