He was citing them to show to what easy victories a navy exposed itself in which, by neglect of scientific study and alert observation, tactics had sunk into a mere senile formula.

'They know,' he continues, 'that we are in no state to oppose them with well-combined movements so as to profit by the kind of disorder which is the natural result of this kind of attack.

They know if they throw their attack on one part of a much extended line, that part is soon destroyed.' Thus he arrives at two fundamental laws: '1.

That our system of a long line of battle is worthless in face of an enemy who attacks with his ships formed in groups (_reunis en pelotons_), and told off to engage a small number of ships at different points in our line.2.That the only tactical system to oppose to theirs is to have at least a double line, with reserve squadrons on the wings stationed in such a manner as to bear down most easily upon the points too vigorously attacked.' The whole of his far-sighted paper is in fact an admirable study of the conditions under which impetuous attacks and elaborate combinations are respectively called for.

But from both points of view the single line for a large fleet is emphatically condemned, while in our instructions of 1816 not a hint of its weakness appears.