Also in Nicolas, _Despatches and Letters_, vi.443.Obvious mistakes in punctuation have been corrected in the text.
[2] _Cf._ the similar remark of De Chaves, _supra_, p.

5.
_LORD NELSON_, 1805.
[+Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.+[1]] _Memorandum_.
_Secret_.

Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.
Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships, _which_ will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct.
The second in command will,[2] after _my_ intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.
If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear.
I should therefore probably make the second in command's[4] signal, to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever he[5] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced).

My line would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must be made to capture.
The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two to three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the centre, to the rear of their fleet.

I will suppose twenty sail of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships engaged.[6] Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others.