But Nelson's judgment was right.

He knew his opponent's lack of decision, he knew the individual shortcomings of the allied ships, and he knew he had only to throw dust, as he did, in their eyes for the wild scheme to succeed.

As Jurien de la Graviere has most wisely said 'Le genie de Nelson c'est d'avoir compris notre faiblesse.' Yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather, there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the Conqueror: that by an error of judgment Nelson spoilt his attack by unnecessary haste.

The moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action.

The confusion of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe's manoeuvre that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was, every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or trebled on.