The same book has yet another additional signal 'for the leading ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle,' apparently the latest of the three, but not specifically attributed either to Pigot or Hood.
With the Additional Instructions used by Rodney the system culminated.
For officers with any real feeling for tactics its work was adequate.
The criticisms of Hood and Rodney on Graves's heart-breaking action off the Chesapeake in 1781 show this clearly enough.

'When the enemy's van was out,' wrote Hood, 'it was greatly extended beyond the centre and rear, and might have been attacked with the whole force of the British fleet.' And again, 'Had the centre gone to the support of the van and the signal for the line been hauled down ...

the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed to ...

the centre division.' Here, besides the vital principle of concentration, we have a germ even of the idea of containing, and Rodney is equally emphatic.

'His mode of fighting I will never follow.