He admitted that it might be wise to renew intercourse with the Kabul ruler if he first expressed his regret for previous misunderstandings; but later he wrote to Edwardes: 'I dare say you are right; still, I cannot divest myself of the idea that it is _a mistake_, and will end in mixing us up in Afghan politics and affairs more than is desirable.

The strength which a treaty can give us seems to be a delusion.

It will be like the reed on which, if a man lean, it will break and pierce his hand.' John Nicholson, Outram, and James Abbott agreed with Lawrence.
They urged that any advance on our part would be looked upon as an indication of conscious weakness; and the probability was that an arrogant, irritated Mussulman ruler would regard an overture as a proof of our necessity, and would make our necessity his opportunity.
But Lord Dalhousie, while anxious to avoid any communication being made which could be liable to misconstruction, saw neither objection nor risk in opening the door to reconciliation, provided no undue anxiety was displayed on our part.

The Governor-General practically left the matter in the hands of Edwardes, who lost no time in trying to attain the desired object.

The greatest forbearance and diplomatic skill were necessary to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory termination, but they were concluded at last, most successfully, and to Edwardes alone is due the credit.