Lyall took it without delay to Lord Ripon, who from the first had been in favour of a force being sent from Kabul, but had refrained from ordering the movement in deference to the views held by some members of his Council, whose longer experience of India, His Excellency considered, entitled their opinions to be treated with respect.
I set to work at once to organize the column which I was to have the great honour of commanding.

In this most congenial duty I received every possible assistance and encouragement from Stewart; he gave me carte-blanche, and I should only have had myself to blame if every unit had not been as efficiently equipped as circumstances would admit.
I wished that the force should be composed, as far as possible, of those who had served with me throughout the campaign; but as some of the regiments (more especially Native corps) had been away from their homes for two years, and had had more than their share of fighting, besides having suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness, I considered it right to consult their commanders before detailing the troops.

With the exception of three, who thought that their regiments had been long enough away from India, all, to my great delight, eagerly responded to my call, and I took upon myself to promise the men that they should not be left to garrison Kandahar, but should be sent back to India as soon as the fighting ceased.
When the several regiments were decided upon, every man not likely to stand the strain of prolonged forced marches was weeded out, and the scale of baggage, tents, and impedimenta was reduced to a minimum.[7] I had no fear as to the officers and men ably and cheerfully performing their part of the task; we had been long enough together to enable us thoroughly to understand and trust each other, and I felt that I could depend upon each and all to respond heartily to whatever call I might make upon them.
The question of supplies was my greatest anxiety, and I had many consultations with my experienced Commissariat officer, Major Badcock, before I could feel satisfied in this respect.
The transport, as I have already recorded, was in good order; it was fortunate that the soldiers had been practised in loading, leading, and tending the animals, for the Afghan drivers deserted to a man a march or two from Kabul, and the Hazaras followed their example on reaching their own country.

Sir Donald Stewart's account of the troubles he had encountered during his march from Kandahar was not very encouraging, and I should have been glad if I could have taken a larger amount of supplies;[8] but on this point I had to be guided by the number of animals that could be allotted to the column, which was necessarily limited, as carriage had to be provided simultaneously for the withdrawal of the rest of the army of occupation.
The strength of the force placed at my disposal consisted of 9,986 men of all ranks and eighteen guns, divided into three brigades of Infantry, one brigade of Cavalry, and three batteries of Mountain Artillery.

There were, besides, over 8,000 followers[9] and 2,300 horses and gun-mules.
It was designated the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force.
Major-General J.Ross, C.B., was given the command of the Infantry division, his three Brigadier-Generals being Herbert Macpherson, T.D.
Baker, and Charles Macgregor.