I felt it would be in the future as it had been in the past, and that there would always be the danger of a Ruler, made supreme by the aid of our money and our arms, turning against us for some supposed grievance, or at the instigation of a foreign Power, as had happened with Sher Ali.
A strong, united Afghanistan was very desirable, no doubt, could we be certain that its interests and ours would always remain identical; but, in addition to the chance of its strength and unity being used against us, there was the certainty that, even if the man we might choose as Amir were to remain perfectly loyal, at his death Afghan history would repeat itself; the succession to the throne would be disputed, and the unification would have to begin all over again.

For these reasons I had no hesitation in giving it as my opinion that Afghanistan should be disintegrated, and that we should not again attempt to place the whole country under any one Sovereign.
My views must have commended themselves to the Government of India, for in their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 7th January, 1880, they indicated them as the line of policy they proposed to adopt in pursuance of the object they had at heart, viz., the safety of the Indian Empire and the tranquillity of its northern frontier; and in the communication to myself, conveying their idea of the general principles upon which the permanent settlement of Afghanistan should be based, the Foreign Secretary wrote that all arrangements for the establishment of a durable Government at Kabul depended on the selection of a suitable Ruler for that province; and that, as it was essential to clear away any apprehension that the British Government contemplated territorial annexation, which might be caused by a prolonged interregnum, it would be very advantageous if one of the principal Sirdars, qualified by his family connexions, his local influence, and his personal following, could be selected as the Ruler of the Kabul State.
There was another very strong reason why the Government of India should wish to find some one to whom the administration of the country could safely be made over.

The first warning notes of a General Election were heard in India early in January.

Afghan affairs were being made a party question, and the policy of the Beaconsfield Government with regard to them was being severely and adversely criticized.

Lord Lytton was, therefore, most anxious that a definite conclusion should be arrived at as to the administration of Afghanistan, and a period put to our occupation of the northern province before the meeting of Parliament should take place.
The difficulty was to find the right man.