_To belong to the objective order is to exist as a physical thing or quality_.
When the plain man and the man of science maintain that a physical thing exists, they use the word in precisely the same sense.

The meaning they give to it is the proper meaning of the word.

It is justified by immemorial usage, and it marks a real distinction.

Shall we allow the philosopher to tell us that we must not use it in this sense, but must say that only sensations and ideas exist?
Surely not.
This would mean that we permit him to obliterate for us the distinction between the external world and what is mental.
But is it right to use the word "experience" to indicate the phenomena which have a place in the objective order?
Can an experience be anything but mental?
There can be no doubt that the suggestions of the word are unfortunate--it has what we may call a subjective flavor.

It suggests that, after all, the things we perceive are sensations or percepts, and must, to exist at all, exist in a mind.