Thus the external world comes to seem to us to be not really a something contrasted with the mental, but a part of the mental world.

We accord to it the attributes of the latter, and rob it of those distinguishing attributes which belong to it by right.

When we have done this, we may feel impelled to say, as did Professor Pearson, that things are not really "outside" of us, as they seem to be, but are merely "projected" outside--thought of as if they were "outside." All this I must explain at length.
Let us come back to the first of the illustrations given above, the case of the fire in my study.

As I stand and look at it, what shall I call the red glow which I observe?
Shall I call it a _quality of a thing_, or shall I call it a _sensation_?
To this I answer: _I may call it either the one or the other, according to its setting among other experiences_.
We have seen (section 15) that sensations and things merely imaginary are distinguished from one another by their setting.

With open eyes we see things; with our eyes closed we can imagine them: we see what is before us; we imagine what lies behind our backs.