He carries his doctrine out to the bitter end in the conclusion that, since we have never had experience of anything beyond sense-impressions, and have no ground for an inference to anything beyond, we must recognize that the only external world of which we know anything is an external world built up out of sense-impressions.

It is, thus, in the mind, and is not external at all; it is only "projected outwards," _thought of_ as though it were beyond us.

Shall we leave the inconsistent position of the plain man and of the psychologist and take our refuge in this world of projected mental constructs?
Before the reader makes up his mind to do this, I beg him to consider the following:-- (1) If the only external world of which we have a right to speak at all is a construct in the mind or _ego_, we may certainly affirm that the world is in the _ego_, but does it sound sensible to say that the _ego_ is somewhere in the world?
(2) If all external things are really inside the mind, and are only "projected" outwards, of course our own bodies, sense-organs, nerves, and brains, are really inside and are merely projected outwards.

Now, do the sense-impressions of which everything is to be constructed "come flowing in" along these nerves that are really inside?
(3) Can we say, when a nerve lies entirely within the mind or _ego_, that this same mind or _ego_ is nearer to one end of the nerve than it is to the other?
How shall we picture to ourselves "the conscious _ego_ of each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves"?
How can the _ego_ place the whole of itself at the end of a nerve which it has constructed within itself?
And why is it more difficult for it to get to one end of a nerve like this than it is to get to the other?
(4) Why should the thing "at the other end of the nerve" remain unknown and unknowable?
Since the nerve is entirely in the mind, is purely a mental construct, can anything whatever be at the end of it without being in the mind?
And if the thing in question is not in the mind, how are we going to prove that it is any nearer to one end of a nerve which is inside the mind than it is to the other?
If it may really be said to be at the end of the nerve, why may we not know it quite as well as we do the end of the nerve, or any other mental construct?
It must be clear to the careful reader of Professor Pearson's paragraphs, that he does not confine himself strictly to the world of mere "projections," to an outer world which is really _inner_.

If he did this, the distinction between inner and outer would disappear.