It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line of defence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest fortresses in the world.

What principle in military science would justify such a plan of campaign?
We are fully aware of the great advantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are also aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to accomplish that object.

It may, and probably will ere long, be made to surrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege.

By advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, we could cut off the Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and then, as circumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy in the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege of Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time.
We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that _an army should choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should either pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications with his base_.

It is the opinion of men of the best military talent in our army that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions at the same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against Canada; and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well fortified in time of peace.