With these operations terminated the Northern campaign of 1814, the last which has been conducted on that frontier.
Let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this line.
The first works are at the Falls of St.Mary, on the western extremity of the line.
The second works are at Mackinaw.
The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron.
The fourth works are near Detroit.
The fifth works are near Buffalo.
The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river.
The seventh works are at Oswego.
The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor.
The ninth works are below Ogdensburg.
The tenth works are at Rouse's Point.
The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the Kennebec or the Penobscot.
The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St.Croix.
All these works are small, and simple in their character, well calculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, but incapable of resisting a protracted siege.

They are entirely different in their character from those on the coast, the latter being intended principally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to the operations of more disciplined troops.
This system of defence for our Northern frontier has been much commented on by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various opinions have been advanced respecting its merits.

Some have thought that more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of this line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the central or Montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach a higher value to the eastern extremity of the line.
These last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters of the Kennebec and the Penobscot, and then advance upon Quebec, a distance of some 250 miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through the valley of the Chaudiere.

Here is only a single road, but little travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness.
General Jomini says emphatically, that _a line of operations should always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises_,--an insuperable objection to the Kennebec route, except as a diversion to the main attack.

But there are still stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the transportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,--a contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length of time.