The _fourth_, consisting of three thousand three hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of Nova Scotia; thus ending the campaign without a single important result.

It was commenced under favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and a vast superiority of force; _but this superiority was again more than counterbalanced by the faulty plans of the English, and by the fortifications which the French had erected, in such positions as to give them a decided advantage in their military operations._ Washington early recommended the same system of defence for the English on the Ohio; and, after Braddock's defeat, advised "the erection of small fortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which means the country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and it will also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the rout again." But this advice of Washington was unheeded, and the campaign of 1756 was based upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one.

The _first_ division, of three thousand men, was to operate against Fort Du Quesne; the _second_, of six thousand men, against Niagara; the _third_, of ten thousand men, against Crown Point; and a _fourth_, of two thousand men, was to ascend the Kennebec river, destroy the settlements on the Chaudiere, and, by alarming the country about Quebec, produce a diversion in favor of the third division, which was regarded as the main army, and was directed along the principal line of operations.

The entire French forces at this time consisted of only three thousand regulars and a body of Canadian militia.

Nevertheless, the English, with forces nearly _six times_ as numerous, closed the campaign without gaining a single advantage.
We here see that the French, with very inferior forces, still continued successful in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over their enemy, and gaining ground upon his colonies.