The French navy was at this time utterly incompetent to their defence; while England supported a maritime force at an annual expense of near _ninety millions of dollars._ Her largest fleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not unfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping.

"At this period," says one of her naval historians, "the naval force of Britain, so multiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimate knowledge of their (the French) harbors, their bays and creeks; her officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to be met with in every situation." On the other hand, these harbors and towns were frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortifications and militia.

And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed during the entire contest.

They were frequently attacked, and in some instances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent lodgment; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies.

This certainly was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the British navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost total annihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly proven.
Why then did these places, escape?
We know of no other reason, than that _they were fortified_; and that the French knew how to defend their fortifications.