In case of an attack by a large party, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive field-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in this way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the convoy.
As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small successive convoys than by periodical and large ones.

Even should some of the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a large periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture much to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an important military operation.

If the Prussian army, when besieging Olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have forced them to raise the siege and to retreat.
Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in position will require the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of provisions.
The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is always very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on this point.

Indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able and active enemy in pursuit.

In such a case, the loss of the provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most terrible disasters.