Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon took an interior position and destroyed them.

In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of Napoleon and Grouchy.
_Diverging_ lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines.

Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809.
_Interior_ lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of the campaign.

There may, however, be cases where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank; the geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of other collateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary.

But as a general rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate forces, will lead to decisive results.
Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and that of Paris, and his operations previous to the Battle of Ligny in 1815, are all brilliant examples under this head.
To change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and follow _accidental lines_, is always a delicate affair, and can only be resorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops.