They employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but generally the flying-sap were employed." It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the French approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the counterscarp of the Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reached within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan.
This description of the operations of the English at the siege of Sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges in the Spanish Peninsula.

It certainly is very strange that a great nation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and difficult duties of that arm.

What excuse can ever be offered for substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and is always so necessary an element of a good military organization! While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immense importance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude from the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large development are better suited for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men and military stores.

We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on this point, and also make a short extract from the recently published Journal of the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel.
Captain McClelland says:-- "This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy, which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence.

It was, that the siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen) fortifications over those of a permanent nature.